Introduction

Amidst growing geopolitical urgency, the Western Balkans – a region historically and culturally intertwined with the European project – remain in a prolonged state of accession limbo (Koppa, 2022). Despite years of political and institutional reform, the countries continue to face stalled negotiations, recurrent vetoes, and uncertain timelines. Meanwhile, external actors such as China, Russia, and Turkey have expanded their influence in the region through strategic investments and soft power, capitalizing on the EU’s institutional stagnation and mixed signals (Koppa & Tzifakis, 2024; Bianco, 2024). While political narratives often place the blame for delays on candidate states, a more critical perspective reveals that the core barriers lie within the EU itself.

This paper argues that the primary obstacle to enlargement in the Western Balkans is not the readiness of the region but rather the EU’s own institutional inertia and political fragmentation. Enlargement has increasingly become a tool of rhetorical geopolitics rather than a substantive political commitment, a symptom of deeper dysfunctions within the Union’s governance model.

The State of Enlargement in the Western Balkans

More than a decade after the accession of Croatia in 2013, the European Union has made no further expansions into the Western Balkans, despite the region being widely acknowledged as an integral part of the European project. Although countries such as Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina remain officially engaged in the accession process, the momentum has visibly stalled. The post-2013 period has been characterized by shifting EU priorities, a deepening institutional crisis, and growing internal political fragmentation within the Union itself, all of which have contributed to the relegation of enlargement to the periphery of EU policymaking (Koppa, 2022).

The 2023 Enlargement Package signaled renewed interest in expansion, especially in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, the emphasis was placed on Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia — with Bosnia-Herzegovina included only marginally — leaving the Western Balkans in a state of prolonged uncertainty (European Commission, 2023). Despite repeated rhetorical commitments, actual accession negotiations have either been delayed or remain symbolic. For instance, North Macedonia and Albania experienced years-long delays over bilateral disputes, while Serbia and Montenegro, which were once considered frontrunners, face frozen negotiation “clusters” due to concerns about democratic regression and unresolved regional tensions (Bechev, 2024).

The EU’s approach to the Western Balkans has also been marked by inconsistency and vulnerability to national vetoes. Bulgaria’s unilateral veto on North Macedonia’s accession negotiations over historical and linguistic disputes and Hungary’s selective support of Serbia while blocking Ukraine exemplify the politicisation of enlargement by individual member states (Alexandris & Armakolas, 2025). These vetoes, rooted in national political agendas, have derailed the formal process and contributed to growing cynicism among Western Balkan governments and societies.

Meanwhile, rival powers have capitalised on the vacuum left by the EU’s indecisiveness. China, Russia, and Turkey have deepened their presence in the region through infrastructure investments, soft loans, media influence, and diplomatic outreach, especially in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro (Koppa & Tzifakis, 2024; Bianco, 2024). These developments not only threaten the EU’s credibility in its immediate neighbourhood but also expose the limits of its normative power.

Despite this strategic fragility, the Western Balkan countries continue to engage in institutional reforms, often at considerable domestic political cost. Nevertheless, these efforts have not been met with consistent incentives or binding timelines from Brussels. The accession process remains vague, over-bureaucratised, and prone to politicisation, contributing to what many analysts describe as a “frozen accession process” (Balfour & Lehne, 2024).

In summary, while the Western Balkan states have maintained their formal aspiration to join the EU, the political reality suggests a structural impasse. Enlargement in the region has become more performative than procedural, a stalled process that reflects not just the challenges within candidate countries, but more critically, the EU’s failure to uphold a coherent and credible enlargement strategy.

Institutional Obstacles within the EU

While political rhetoric in Brussels continues to endorse EU enlargement, particularly in light of growing geopolitical pressures, the institutional architecture of the Union remains fundamentally unfit to support meaningful expansion. The EU’s internal structures are increasingly recognised as a core barrier to enlargement, not only in terms of procedural complexity but also due to systemic inefficiencies, democratic deficits, and political fragmentation (Stefanou, 2020; Duff, 2022).

One of the most persistent issues is the unanimity requirement in the Council of the EU for key foreign policy and enlargement decisions. Under this rule, any single member state may veto accession-related measures, often for reasons unrelated to EU criteria. As noted by Csaky & Grant (2025), there have been 45 recorded veto incidents in Council deliberations from 2011 to 2025, with nearly a third occurring in the last 18 months alone, a trend that exposes the fragility of consensus-driven policymaking. Hungary, for instance, has used its veto power not only to obstruct Ukraine’s membership talks but also to block enlargement-related sanctions and aid, citing concerns over minority rights and national interest (Brzozowski, 2024; Alexandris & Armakolas, 2025).

Although the Lisbon Treaty introduced mechanisms, such as the passerelle clauses, that could allow for qualified majority voting in sensitive areas like foreign policy, these provisions remain unused. Their activation would significantly reduce the veto power of individual states and streamline decision-making, particularly in the enlargement context. However, political reluctance to pursue such reforms, especially from smaller or more nationalist-leaning governments, has stalled any meaningful institutional change (Buras & Morina, 2023).

Further weakening democratic legitimacy is the restricted role of the European Parliament in core areas of integration. Despite being the only directly elected EU institution, the Parliament lacks legislative initiative and plays only a consultative role in key areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and taxation, as codified in Articles 36 TEU and 113-115 TFEU. As a result, some of the Union’s most consequential decisions are made without full parliamentary oversight, reinforcing perceptions of technocracy and undermining public trust (Jaakkola, 2019; Stefanou, 2022).

The resulting status quo is one of structural inertia. EU institutions, constrained by internal complexity and divergent national interests, are unable to function effectively as a strategic actor in the Western Balkans. Enlargement, far from being a priority, becomes collateral damage in a system designed to protect domestic veto players and avoid political risk. As Balfour (2024) observes, the over-reliance on technocratic mechanisms and intergovernmental bargaining has fostered a Union more reactive than proactive and certainly ill-equipped to manage new rounds of accession under current rules. 

In this context, it becomes evident that the obstacles to enlargement are not only external (i.e., related to candidate countries), but also – and perhaps primarily – internal. Without significant institutional reform, particularly concerning decision-making procedures and democratic accountability, the EU lacks the operational and political capacity to expand effectively.

Enlargement as a Rhetorical Device

While the European Union frequently presents enlargement as a strategic and value-driven objective, particularly in light of Russia’s invasion, the EU’s enlargement discourse is driven more by strategic language than by actual commitment, suggesting the existence of a discursive-practical gap. Geopolitical urgency is repeatedly referenced, yet implementation lags significantly in the Western Balkans (Radic Milosavljevic & Petrović, 2025). Enlargement was used more as a geopolitical stabilisation tool than a path to guaranteed membership—the rhetoric of strategic necessity did not translate into binding timetables or substantial institutional progress in the Western Balkans (Anghel & Džankić, 2023).

The 2023 Enlargement Package, hailed as a “turning point” in EU external strategy, exemplifies this contradiction. While it proposed accession negotiations for Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and candidate status for Georgia, its implementation mechanisms remain vague, and its impact on long-stalled Balkan accessions has been negligible (European Commission, 2023; Mentzelopoulou, 2025). Despite references to “renewed momentum,” the Union continues to treat the region as a periphery for containment rather than integration.

At the same time, enlargement discourse has become highly politicised within the EU itself. Domestic electoral pressures, rising far-right influence, and nationalist narratives have transformed enlargement into a transactional issue, subject to domestic bargaining and identity politics rather than a shared European vision (Alexandris & Armakolas, 2025; Hancock, Jopson & Bounds, 2024). Hungary is supporting Serbia’s accession while blocking Ukraine’s and this illustrates how member states manipulate enlargement policy to serve bilateral or ideological interests (Brzozowski, 2024). Similarly, France’s National Rally and Austria’s FPÖ openly link enlargement to immigration fears and the erosion of national sovereignty (Chiodi, 2025; Joint Research Centre, 2025).

This fragmented landscape reinforces the notion that enlargement today is less about structural integration and more about signalling, a means for the EU to project geopolitical relevance without committing to the institutional consequences. As Hollander (2024) notes, this undermines the EU’s credibility as a normative power and diminishes its capacity to shape developments in its immediate neighbourhood.

Furthermore, internal EU actors increasingly frame enlargement as conditional on deep institutional reform, but without setting out timelines or binding commitments (Buras & Morina, 2023). In practice, this serves to defer responsibility and place the burden of action on a hypothetical future, while the current governance model remains unchanged (Ghincea & Pleșca, 2025). Last but not least, since the early 2010s, as the EU’s credibility began suffering unprecedentedly due to its own crises (eurozone, migration, and democratic erosion) Balkan citizens have become increasingly sceptical of an accession process they consider as politically driven and strategically ambivalent. Thus, enlargement ends as a form of strategic ambiguity: constantly referenced, seldom enacted, and rarely prioritized in day-to-day policy.

Hypothesis Evaluation

The analysis of institutional barriers, rhetorical inconsistencies, and politicisation within the EU collectively reinforce the central hypothesis of this paper: that the primary obstacle to enlargement in the Western Balkans lies within the EU’s own governance failures rather than the readiness of the candidate countries. The combination of veto politics, technocratic inertia, and enlargement fatigue reveals a system structurally incapable of delivering on its own promises. Western Balkan states continue to implement reforms and express commitment to European integration, despite the citizens’ dissatisfaction.

These efforts, however, are met with vague timelines and inconsistent incentives. The resulting credibility gap undermines not only the accession process but also the EU’s geopolitical influence. The hypothesis, therefore, is confirmed: enlargement has become a rhetorical instrument that masks institutional paralysis at the heart of the Union.

Conclusion

This article concludes that EU enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans is hindered less by external shortcomings and more by internal dysfunctions within the Union. The disconnect between rhetorical commitments and institutional capabilities has transformed enlargement into a symbolic act, eroding trust in the process. Moving forward, serious consideration must be given to institutional reforms, particularly in decision-making procedures, if the EU is to reclaim its normative and strategic relevance in the region. Further research could explore comparative models of regional integration or investigate citizen-level perceptions of EU legitimacy in candidate states. Ultimately, without addressing its structural weaknesses, the EU risks not only delaying enlargement indefinitely but also diminishing its own credibility as a geopolitical actor.

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